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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the Zimbabwean crisis from the lens of dealers who benefitted from the 
chaotic and highly speculative Zimbabwean economy during the decade of crisis (2000-2008). 
The impression created by the bulk of the literature that has been published on Zimbabwe during 
its decade of crisis is that the political impasse and economic meltdown left a trail of 
impoverishment in the country. This paper challenges this widely held perception by arguing that 
even though the Zimbabwean crisis wreaked havoc for most Zimbabweans’ livelihood, this is not 
entirely true for some of the dealers who made a ‘killing’ from Zimbabwe’s burgeoning black 




The main argument in this paper is that despite the grim political and economic outlook that left 
negative social ramifications for Zimbabweans during the decade of crisis (2000-2008) it should 
be borne in mind that there are some dealers who benefitted materially from Zimbabwe’s corrupt 
and criminal ‘black market’. This angle of the crisis is largely missing from the bulk of the 
Zimbabwean literature that has been published on the crisis, which mostly focuses on the 
hardships Zimbabweans experienced as a consequence of the political instability and a 
precarious economy. The paper also contends that Bourdieu’s concepts of the habitus and the 
field are enlightening in explaining the modus operandi of some of the dealers, notably during 
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the peak of the crisis in 2008.          
 As Zimbabwe’s economic crisis deepened in the 2000s and the formal sector shrank, the 
informal economy burgeoned and sustained many livelihoods (Chagonda 2011, 2012). The 
significance of the informal economy is in stark contrast to what the informal economy was like 
at the advent of independence in 1980. Then, the informal economy in Zimbabwe was relatively 
small, accounting for less than 10% of the labour force (Mhone 1992). The largely speculative 
nature of Zimbabwe’s informal economy during the period of hyper-inflation was a dominant 
feature. The informal economy also known as the ‘black market’, was very lucrative because of 
the shortages of foreign currency and most basic commodities in Zimbabwe. As a result, there 
was a thriving ‘black market’ in foreign currency dealing, fuel and basic goods like mealie-meal, 
sugar, cooking-oil, and soap, brought by cross-border traders into Zimbabwe from neighbouring 
countries such as South Africa and Botswana. A speculative informal economy will in most 
cases thrive in hyper-inflationary situations, because it provides an opportunity for people to 
hoard goods and re-sell them later at inflated prices rather than keeping money which loses 
value. In this case, speculative activities assist people to hedge against the devastating effects of 
hyper-inflation (Hanke 2008). The ‘black market’ also thrived in countries that faced hyper-
inflation in the past such as Germany during the Weimar Republic (1920-1923), Argentina 
(1988-1989) and Yugoslavia (1992-1994), as most goods became available in the informal 
economy (Dornbusch, Sturzenegger, and Wolf 1990; Carmen 2002; Petrovic, Bogetic, and 
Vugosevic 1998).           
 This paper is based on a larger doctoral study conducted in Harare in 2008 and early 2009 
to ascertain the different responses of workers in formal employment and dealers in the informal 
economy to Zimbabwe’s hyper-inflation and the political crisis. A total of 18 dealers were 
interviewed and their activities on the ‘black market’ ranged from foreign currency deals that 
included ‘burning money’, to trading in scarce commodities and dealing in diamonds from the 
Marange diamond fields. The observation method was also used in the study and it proved to be 
quite insightful in seeing directly how members of the urban working class and how others who 
had left formal employment for the informal sector were earning their livelihoods. Through my 
observations, I was able to see activities such as foreign currency dealing and commodity trading 
in the informal sector in places such as Mbare’s Mupedzanhamo market, Roadport (World Bank) 
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and Copacabana near the CBD of Harare, where the foreign currency dealers operated. The 
spectacle of seeing the foreign currency dealers really left a lasting impression, as each time I 
visited Roadport it would be a hive of activity, as forex dealers would move around, oblivious of 
the presence of the police, who used to also maintain a sizeable presence at the bus terminus. In 
return for the bribe the police required, the forex dealers with bundles of money and others with 
parked cars with trunk-loads of money were given the liberty to make ‘fortunes’. I also observed 
the conspicuous consumption patterns that were also very evident as some of the dealers moved 
around in fancy vehicles with personalized number plates while others were constructing double-
storey houses in Harare’s suburbs such as New Marlborough. 
Studies on Zimbabwe’s Informal Economy during the Crisis Years 
A number of studies were conducted on Zimbabwe’s informal economy during the 2000s and 
most of them focus mostly on the survival strategies employed by informal sector workers to 
stem the effects of the crisis. Studies by Ndlela (2005) and Muzvidziwa focused on Zimbabwean 
female cross-border traders. Moyo (2009), Jones (2010) and Tamukamoyo (2010) conducted 
doctoral studies on the urban poor and informal traders in Zimbabwe during the decade of crisis. 
Moyo (2009) investigates and analyses livelihood strategies employed by the urban poor in an 
endeavor to bridge household food gaps under conditions of food insecurity and macro-economic 
melt-down. He investigates the effectiveness, viability and sustainability of livelihood strategies, 
the role and capacity of the state in addressing the food crisis, as well as state policies, laws and 
the ‘politics of the stomach’, and whether or not they have been a constraint to people’s 
livelihood strategies. Moyo focuses on the urban poor in Bulawayo and the majority of his 
subjects are unemployed people. Jones’ (2010) study seeks to understand the effects of hyper-
inflation and economic decline on young men in Chitungwiza, a working class township just 
outside Harare. Jones examines the development of a new logic of everyday economic action and 
argues that the kukiya-kiya economy – in local parlance, kukiya-kiya refers to multiple forms of 
‘making do’ that are sometimes illegal - replaced the ‘real’ economy after 2000. For Jones, 
people participated in the kukiya-kiya economy as an individual survival strategy. Jones 
contends that the kukiya-kiya activities in Zimbabwe’s informal sector during the peak of the 
crisis had far reaching repercussions on the ethics and morality of the Zimbabwean people in 
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general, as the culture of surviving through means that were not straight appeared to have taken 
root in the country. Tamukamoyo (2010) focused on the nature of informal economic activities 
among urban traders in Harare, Zimbabwe. His point of reference was on the precarious lives of 
informal traders who were dealing in clothes and shoes, DVDs, arts and crafts and second-hand 
books and operating from a particular flea market in Harare.     
 However, unlike the afore-mentioned studies on informal traders who struggled to 
survive and barely stayed afloat during the crisis, this study focuses on dealers who thrived and 
made a ‘killing’ on the Zimbabwean ‘black market’ through foreign currency deals that included 
‘burning money’, commodity trading and diamond dealing. 
Foreign Currency Dealing 
Foreign currency dealing was one of the ways through which some dealers were able to benefit 
financially from the Zimbabwean crisis. Foreign currency shortages became acute in Zimbabwe 
in the early 2000s, largely as a result of sanctions that were placed on the country by the Bretton-
Woods Institutions and the western countries. The non-performance of key sectors of the 
Zimbabwean economy such as agriculture, manufacturing and tourism also contributed to the 
foreign currency crunch faced by the country (Hanke 2008). Foreign currency dealers emerged in 
huge numbers to fill in the void of providing foreign currency which the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe and most banks were struggling to do. Foreign currency dealers at the Roadport bus 
terminus, Ximex Mall and Copacabana taxi-rank would buy and re-sell foreign currency to 
members of the public at a profit and this wreaked havoc on the precarious Zimbabwean dollar 
which kept plummeting in its value against the world’s major currencies until it was finally 
shelved in April 2009. Foreign currency remittances from Zimbabweans in the diaspora meant 
that forex dealers always had access to foreign currency as people who received foreign currency 
from relatives or friends outside the country would sell their forex to the dealers who almost 
always offered more lucrative exchange rates as compared to the banks. One such foreign 
currency dealer whom I interviewed and who appeared to be doing quite well in this foreign 
currency trade was Alexander Muchirahondo. Alexander (popularly known as Alex amongst 
forex traders at Harare’s Roadport bus terminus) who once worked for Olivine Industries as a 
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motor-mechanic said that he was retrenched by the company in 2003 and decided to engage in 
forex dealing as a means of survival. Alex narrated: 
When I was retrenched, I had to come up with a plan for survival and I decided to join other forex dealers 
who were buying and selling forex at Roadport bus terminus. I used part of my retrenchment package to 
buy forex worth US$ 1 500, and that is how I began dealing in late 2003. I can tell you that from buying 
and selling forex, I was able to change my life in no time. I have many customers who buy forex from me 
who include some of the banks and even the reserve bank. After two years of forex dealing, I was able to 
import  a good second-hand Mercedes from Singapore and I also managed to buy a housing stand in New 
Marlborough and I am busy building a double-storey house there. After I complete constructing my new 
house in New Marlborough, I shall leave Chitungwiza where I am currently staying.  
As Zimbabwe’s foreign currency crisis persisted and worsened in the 2000s, the reserve bank 
began to actively participate on the country’s forex black market by printing huge quantities of 
Zimbabwean dollar notes which it would give to its agents known as runners who would buy 
foreign currency on the black market with the printed money and surrender it to the reserve bank 
for a commission (Chagonda 2011). The wanton printing of Zimbabwean dollar notes by the 
reserve bank stoked the fires of hyper-inflation which officially peaked at 231 million percent in 
July 2008 (CSO, August 2008). However, one of the world’s leading experts on inflation, Hanke, 
argues that Zimbabwe’s hyper-inflation peaked at a stupendous 89.7 sextillion percent in 
October 2008 (Hanke 2008). I interviewed James Pinduka, one of the reserve bank’s forex 
runners and he revealed: 
I have been buying foreign currency for the reserve bank on the black market since 2006. I get bags of 
Zimbabwean dollars from the reserve bank and I use that money to purchase forex which I will surrender 
to the reserve bank for a commission of 10% to 15%. This is big business because I deal with huge 
amounts of cash. As you can see, I have been able to buy myself this Camry vehicle and I also invest 
some of the money I make on the stock exchange. I regularly buy shares in companies such as Econet and 
PPC cement. At least by investing some of my money in well performing stocks, this might help me 
financially in the future as no one knows when these deals might come to an end. This will obviously not 
last forever, but for now I will try to make as much money as I can.    
As James’ interview reveals, some of the dealers had the sense to invest in ventures which they 
envisaged would cushion them in future, such as Zimbabwe’s well performing stock exchange 
during the crisis, in the event their deals went awry. The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE), 
performed very well during the period of the crisis, as individuals and companies chose to trade 
on the bourse’s best performing shares, as opposed to saving money, which was being eroded 
rapidly by hyper-inflation. The excellent performance of the ZSE defied basic economic 
reasoning, causing Koning (2008) to accuse some stock market commentators and analysts of 
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making simplistic linkages between the stock market and a country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). Stock market analysts normally inform the public that any event that stimulates GDP 
growth drives stock prices up, and any event that hurts GDP growth pushes stocks down (Koning 
2008). The economic malaise that occurred in Zimbabwe, however, completely contradicted that 
logic. Koning (2008) argues that the ZSE was the best performing stock exchange in Africa, 
during 2007 and 2008, with the key Zimbabwe industrials index going up by 595 percent over a 
period of twelve months in 2007.         
 Some of the foreign currency dealers were also involved in the ‘burning of money’ 
financial transactions. This ‘burning of money’ was a form of bank transfers done through a 
banking system known as Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS). Under these RTGS transactions, 
if a person gave US dollars to the bank and requested that the money be transferred into their 
accounts as Zimbabwean dollars, that individual would get Zimbabwean dollars that were many 
times higher than the prevailing exchange rates. The trillions and quadrillions of Zimbabwean 
dollars which some of these dealers obtained through the ‘burning of money’ facilitated the 
possibility of other economic activities. For instance, some of the forex dealers interviewed 
revealed that the ‘burning of money’ was assisting them to fly with Air Zimbabwe for almost 
nothing to countries such as China and the United Arab Emirates (Dubai) to buy electronic goods 
and clothing items which they would re-sell in Zimbabwe.  The dealers would ‘burn’ a few US 
dollars and then pay for their airfares with the quadrillions or quintillions of Zimbabwean dollars 
obtained in the RTGS transactions. In reality, the national airline was making huge losses as 
became evident when the Zimbabwean economy was dollarized. Elizabeth Mhlanga who was a 
forex dealer who had opened a clothing boutique at Sam Levy’s village in Borrowdale, Harare 
narrated how the ‘burning of money’ was benefiting her: 
My boutique at Sam Levy’s village is doing very well but this is because I am able to buy quality clothes 
from Dubai and China which I re-sell at very profitable prices. I go once a month to one of these two 
countries with Air Zimbabwe. The airfares are very affordable to me as I ‘burn’ a few US dollars with the 
bank and then pay my airfare into Air Zimbabwe’s account in the form of Zimbabwean dollars.  
Commodity Traders 
Basic commodities such as mealie-meal, rice, sugar, cooking oil and soap were scarce in 
Zimbabwe during the decade of crisis and this led to widespread cross-border trading activities 
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which saw a number of Zimbabweans going to neighbouring countries such as South Africa and 
Botswana to buy goods which they would re-sell at a profit in Zimbabwe (Ndlela 2006, 
Muzvidziwa 2005). In an endeavor to ease the shortage of basic commodities, the government of 
Zimbabwe through the reserve bank made a decision to establish what were known as people’s 
shops. People’s shops were introduced by Gideon Gono, the Governor of Zimbabwe’s Reserve 
Bank in June 2008 (The Worker, August 2008). These shops sold basic commodities at cheap 
prices. Commodities such as cooking oil, sugar, soap and mealie-meal were known as Basic 
Commodities Supply Side Intervention (BACOSSI). However, there were reports that most of 
these BACOSSI products were looted by well-connected traders and top ZANU (PF) officials, 
who would re-sell these commodities at higher prices on the ‘black market’. Michael Sango, one 
of the commodity traders opened up to me: 
These days I am into BACOSSI trading and I am making a ‘killing’ because I am now supplying 
supermarkets in Braeside, Waterfalls and Greencroft with all sorts of goods that I am hoarding from the 
people’s shops at very low prices…It is not easy though to just get goods like sugar, rice and cooking oil 
from these people’s shops. You need to be well connected. I am fortunate to have a brother of mine who 
works at the reserve bank of Zimbabwe who has access to these BACOSSI products. He delivers the 
products to me and all I have to do is to look for customers and then we split the profits. 
Michael’s expose reveals how Zimbabwe’s black market was fraught with a lot of corrupt and 
even criminal activities during the crisis years. 
Dealing in Diamonds 
In the mid-2000s a diamond rush fever gripped Zimbabweans as reports surfaced that huge 
diamond deposits had been discovered in the Chiadzwa area in Zimbabwe’s eastern province of 
Manicaland. The diamond craze also attracted Hararian dwellers such as Dumisani Hove one of 
my dealer respondents, as a number of people went to dig for the alluvial diamonds that were 
near the surface, while others obtained diamonds from Chiadzwa residents in return for bartering 
basic food commodities that were in short supply such as rice and cooking oil. Dumisani who 
was a 26 year old man had once been a panel-beater at Delta Corporation from 2002 to 2004, but 
was now a diamond dealer. Dumisani shared some of his experiences in diamond dealing:  
I have been getting diamonds from Chiadzwa since 2006. Initially, I used to dig for the diamonds just like 
everyone else. However, I am now obtaining diamonds from other diamond diggers whom I give rice, 
sugar or cooking oil. I have since stopped digging for the diamonds in the diamond fields because there 
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are now a lot of soldiers who are patrolling the fields and they will shoot you dead if they see you in these 
fields. Diamond dealing is a deadly game, a lot of people have been killed and I always move around with 
large sums of US dollars which I will use to bribe the police or the army guys, just in case I am found in 
possession of diamonds.  
Diamond dealing during the crisis years was so lucrative that Dumisani revealed that he was 
prepared to even dice with death while on his diamond forays to Chiadzwa because this trade had 
allowed him to buy two cars and a housing stand in Westlea, Harare.  
Dollarisation and the Decline of Dealer Activities  
The dealers’ bubble was, however, burst when the Zimbabwean economy started to dollarize. 
The widespread dollarisation of  the Zimbabwean economy from September 2008 by the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe in response to the weakness and volatility of the Zimbabwean dollar and 
official dollarization which was saw the Zimbabwean dollar being shelved by the Government of 
National Unity (GNU) in April 2009, had devastating effects on the livelihoods of many forex 
dealers, fuel dealers, cellphone airtime dealers and RTGS speculators who were still  ‘burning 
money’. Bloch (2009) argues that the approval of the widespread use of foreign currency by the 
Zimbabwean government, effectively ‘killed’ the beleaguered Zimbabwean dollar and forex 
dealers’ markets. Interviews with forex ‘barons’ like Diva and Dumisani revealed that that forex 
dealing business was one of the earliest casualties of the devastating effects of dollarisation, as 
forex dealers saw business disappear overnight when the Zimbabwean dollar was rejected for 
currencies like the US dollar and the rand, when the government approved the use of foreign 
currency to designated shops that would have applied to sell their products in foreign currency. 
This saw the termination of the use of the Zimbabwean dollar, because even those shops and 
traders that did not have licences or permission from the central bank to charge in forex began to 
do so, thereby rendering the Zimbabwean dollar unwanted legal tender. The Zimbabwe 
Independent of 13 February 2009 aptly sums up the demise of the forex black market when it 
reported: 
A few months ago, fast talking dealers swarmed a downtown intersection that serves as a long-
distance bus depot called Roadport also known as the ‘World Bank’. They waved handfuls and 
bagfuls of cash at this Roadport terminus, the Holiday Inn Hotel, Eastgate shopping mall, Ximex 
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mall and Copa Cabana bus terminus. Now those places are quiet, no shops accept Zimbabwean 
dollars anymore and most dealers are now broke like most other people.  
Some resourceful dealers like Diva were still in the forex business, doing cross-rates between the 
US dollar and the South African rand, even though this was not as rewarding as conducting forex 
exchanges with the Zimbabwean dollar, which was extremely fragile.  Diva also remarked that 
the ‘dollarisation’ of the Zimbabwean economy had wiped out his forex dealing overnight and he 
reflected: 
My lucrative source of survival has been destroyed and I now have to find another alternative 
source in order to put food on the table. I have not decided on what to do next, but in the 
meantime, I am hoarding and selling cellphone recharge cards, but the profits I am making are 
miserly as compared to forex dealing. There are also too many recharge cards hawkers and this 
just makes it more difficult. I am also dealing now in forex cross-rates at roadport. What I do is I 
exchange the rands that I will be having for US dollars with people who will be boarding buses to 
South Africa. A lot of people who will be going to South Africa for shopping in some cases will 
not be having the South African rand, but the US dollars, so for them to transact easily in South 
Africa, they exchange their US dollars for the rands which we will be having. The current official 
exchange rate between the US dollar and the rand hovers around 1:10, but when I am exchanging 
the rands for the US dollars, I use a rate of 1:8, so that I can get some profit from my rands. So in 
other words, I inflate the value of the rand and that is how I make profit from this cross-rate 
system. After engaging in these transactions, I then go to shops and change all the US dollars I 
would have gotten into rands, and I repeat the cycle again. This is not as lucrative as the forex 
dealing we were doing, but at least I get something. But as I told you, I need to look for another 
source of income that is more stable and sustainable. This dollarisation however, has really killed 
some of us.  
The suspension of the RTGS system (‘burning money’) of transacting proved to be a blow to all 
forex dealers interviewed. To the dismay of many forex dealers and speculators, the RTGS 
system was suspended by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe on 3 October 2008, due to the fact that 
a lot of speculators were making fast money overnight and becoming instant trillionaires and 
quadrillionaires in Zimbabwean dollars, thereby stoking hyper-inflation. Too much liquidity was 
being created on the market that was disconnected with production and the sale of goods. Tafara 
Zamchiya, a forex dealer commented, ‘Well, this is only a temporary setback because definitely 
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we were spinning a lot of money using the ‘R Tigo’ system. We shall however find a way of 
continuing with the speculative activities, otherwise how do you think we will survive?  
 The dollarisation of the economy, and the removal of price controls by the National 
Incomes and Pricing Controls Commission (NIPCC) in September 2008, saw the fuel service 
stations suddenly awash with petrol and diesel because they could now openly charge fuel in 
forex without fears that the government would prosecute them. This development saw the fuel 
traders who would sell fuel in the streets or bushes, away from the glare of the police get out of 
business, as most consumers opted to buy fuel from the fuel stations where one was guaranteed 
bona fide fuel which had not been mixed with water or paraffin, as some of these fuel dealers 
were notorious for doing. Fuel dealers were also hurt by competition in the latter part of 2008 
from workers who were now increasingly being paid in the form of fuel coupons which they 
could dispose of, for a price of their liking on the market. Consequently, the influx of fuel 
coupons on the market and the fuel in the service stations put the fuel black market into jeopardy.
 The sealing off of the Chiadzwa diamond fields in Manicaland province of Zimbabwe 
also cut off a very lucrative source of earning a livelihood for the daring, who were prepared to 
go and mine diamonds at the heavily protected fields. The Zimbabwean government decided to 
send the military to seal off the diamond fields in October 2008, on the pretext that the diamonds 
should be mined properly, with the revenue derived from these diamonds going to state coffers, 
so that the government could then use this money for the benefit of the whole nation. The 
Zimbabwean newspaper of 6 March, 2009 reported that the Zimbabwean government confiscated 
100 luxurious vehicles of people who were mostly engaged in forex and diamond deals in early 
March under an operation code-named Mari wakaiwana kupi? (Where did you get your money 
from?) 
As the hyper-inflation increased in Germany, the people began to invest in goods like houses, 
antiques, jewelry and even minor items like soap and hairpins (deCarbonnel 2009). Petty 
thievery also became a common way of coping. Copper pipes and brass armatures were stolen 
and fuel was siphoned from people’s cars. People also bought items which they did not 
necessarily require and bartered them for goods which they needed. The moral standards of 
Berlin plunged, as prostitutes of both sexes filled and roamed the streets. Thus, different types of 
responses to the crisis were witnessed as the Germans grappled with the hyper-inflation.  
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 Keay (2001) contends that during Yugoslavia’s economic recession, people developed 
coping mechanisms that included relying on remittances from relatives living abroad, savings 
and, in particular, the black market. It is Keay’s contention that although Yugoslavia’s black 
market enabled many people to survive, it was dogged by rampant corruption and criminality.  
The black market system diverted tax revenues, scared away foreign investment and turned 
almost everybody into a small-time hustler (Keay 2001). 
The Utility of Bourdieu’s Concepts of the Habitus and Field in Explaining the 
Survivalist Nature of Dealers in Zimbabwe 
Pierre Bourdieu’s (1990) concepts of the habitus and the field are enlightening in explaining the 
manner in which dealers manoeuvred and negotiated their way in Zimbabwe’s unforgiving and 
treacherous economic terrain in the 2000s. Bourdieu (1990) defines habitus as the mental or 
cognitive structures through which people deal with the social world. He further elaborates that 
people are endowed with a series of internalized schemes through which they perceive, 
understand, appreciate and evaluate the social world. Through such schemes, agents both 
produce their practices and perceive and evaluate them. In the Zimbabwean context, dealers as 
agents had to develop a habitus that contained elements of extra-legality in order to gain an edge 
over other agents in Zimbabwe’s precarious and heavily contested economic field. Thus, through 
practices of dealing in foreign currency, scarce commodities, fuel and precious gems, dealers as 
agents were creating a collective habitus of criminality which, however, gave them an advantage 
over other actors. Through practices that involved extra-legality on the black market, dealers 
were able to re-shape the social world to some extent as the culture of hustling, corruption and 
making a quick buck became pervasive amongst many Zimbabweans.    
 The field which is defined by Bourdieu (1990) as an arena of struggle and battle can be 
viewed in the Zimbabwean context as the economic environment which was heavily dominated 
by the black market which had been spawned by hyper-inflation. The position or success of the 
agents (dealers) in Zimbabwe’s black market economy was determined largely by the economic 
and social capital they wielded. Success on the black market was therefore not only determined 
by possessing guts to engage in illegal activities but also by economic capital which meant 
having economic resources such as access to foreign currency in order to participate in the black 
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market activities. Social capital was also critical as it enabled some of the dealers to acquire an 
advantage over other actors as a consequence of having social relations that ensured access to 
deals or even the evasion of arrest. One can therefore label some of the Zimbabwean dealers who 
made fortunes, as agents who possessed a habitus which reflected a knack for survival in the 
murky waters of Zimbabwe’s black market. These dealers were comparable to Bourdieu’s 
tacticians who manoeuvre for advantage in a world that has other tacticians as they possessed 
that sharp eye for a deal at any given opportunity.        
 However, one can also discern that the era of dollarization in Zimbabwe which ‘killed-
off’ the black market and its illegal activities created a sense of hysteresis for some of the 
dealers. Bourdieu (1990) defines hysteresis as a condition that results from having a habitus that 
is not appropriate for the situation in which one lives. That is the reason why some of the 
respondents who were interviewed in this study went back to formal employment because the 
habitus which they had developed during the years of hyper-inflation was now no longer 
compatible with a period of economic stability and the absence of hyper-inflation. 
Conclusion 
Zimbabwe’s ‘dealer moment’ in the 2000s was a fleeting moment but a profound one that 
managed to change some people’s fortunes for the better. This ‘dealer moment’ as argued in this 
paper proved that the Zimbabwean crisis did not only bring doom and gloom to Zimbabweans, 
but it also created opportunities for those with the requisite social and economic capital and also 
courage to make a ‘quick buck’ through all sorts of nefarious activities that were availed by the 
black market. This other face of the Zimbabwean crisis was, however, brought to an abrupt haly 
by the dollarisation of the Zimbabwean economy, which managed to wipe away hyperinflation 
and the black market it had spawned. The Zimbabwean crisis proved that hyperinflation will 
always provide a fertile ground for all sorts of corrupt and criminal activities that will in most 
cases compromise the scruples of a society. Weimar Germany and Yugoslavia’s flirtations with 
hyperinflation during different periods in the twentieth century also expose the damning 
evidence of vices that excessive inflation will always breed. 
 Finally, Bourdieu’s concepts of the habitus and the field are quite useful in unpacking the 
agency that was displayed by some Zimbabweans as they devised different mechanisms of 
13 
 
survival in Zimbabwe’s troubled and treacherous economic environment that was marked by 
high levels of inflation in the 2000s. 
Notes 
1. Kukiya-kiya has also been referred to colloquially as kujingirisa by people taking part in 
informal sector activities. 
2. One major study on the extent of foreign currency remittances to Zimbabwe during the 
decade of crisis was conducted by Lionel Cliffe in Yorkshire, England in 2009. The 
study, which involved 400 Zimbabweans residing in Yorkshire, revealed that on average, 
each Zimbabwean migrant remitted around 300 Pounds per month to relatives and friends 
in Zimbabwe (Cliffe 2009). 
3. Alexander Muchirahondo was interviewed on 3 March 2008. 
4. A sextillion has 21 zeros. 
5. James Pinduka was interviwed on 16 March 2008. 
6. Lonika Msengezi was interviewed on 2 August 2008. 
7. Michael Sango was interviewed on 4 August 2008. 
8. Dumisani Hove was interviewed on 12 April 2008. 
9. Simon Gwenzi was interviewed on 25 March 2008. 
10. Alex Muchirahondo was interviewed for a second time on 29 April 2009. 
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